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Introduction
A small depository institution with a history of a
pronounced seasonal increase in loans relative
to deposits may borrow a substantial portion of
its projected excess from a Federal Reserve Bank
at the basic discount rate. In the aggregate, this
seasonal borrowing program provides only a
scant source of funds to the financial system,
within a framework that is essentially the same
as when the program was introduced in 1973-
Substantial growth of peak seasonal borrowing
in recent years, after a decade or more of signifi-
cant changes in financial market structure, sug-
gests the timeliness of reviewing the rationale for
the seasonal borrowing program. Furthermore,
review seems doubly important because varia-
tions in seasonal borrowing have been compli-
cating monetary policy implementation.
1
The purpose of this paper is threefold. The
first objective is to provide a brief description of
the program and its role in funding banks and
• 1 See Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee
for meetings indicated in table 2.
the banking system. The second is to investigate
the original rationale for the seasonal borrowing
program and to determine how changes in
financial market structure during the intervening
years may have affected that rationale. The third
objective is to explore the connection between
the seasonal borrowing program and monetary
policy implementation. To date, any potential
conflict with monetary policy has been avoided
by flexible policy implementation and technical
changes in the borrowed reserve index of
reserve restraint used to guide open market
operations. These responses do complicate pol-
icy implementation, but flexibility also elimi-
nates what has become a dubious advantage of
the borrowed reserve procedure when seasonal
borrowing is the dominant component of the
index of reserve restraint.
I. The Seasonal
Borrowing Program
The seasonal borrowing program was introduced
in 1973, an outgrowth of a Federal Reserve Task
Force recommendation contained in "Reappraisal
of the Federal Reserve Discount Mechanism," a
three-volume System report published in 1971.
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The stated purpose of the new program was to
assist "...those [member] banks that enjoy only
limited or indirect access to national money
markets and which have definable and relatively
substantial seasonal pressures."
2 The program is
one of three ongoing direct lending facilities
maintained by the Federal Reserve Banks, the
other two being programs for adjustment and
extended credit.
Adjustment credit is available overnight or for
a short period, and cannot be used by an institu-
tion more than occasionally. It is designed for
institutions unexpectedly short of needed funds
in circumstances that make it difficult or impos-
sible to obtain financing from normal market
sources, such as at the end of a day, when
markets are thin or closed. Loans must be collat-
eralized, and the rate charged is the familiar
basic discount rate.
Extended credit, on the other hand, may be
outstanding for many months. It is designed for
an institution in exceptional circumstances—one
working closely with or under the control of
supervisory authorities to resolve financial diffi-
culties that limit its access to normal market
2 Federal Reserve press release, April 12,1973.
sources of funds. Loans are fully collateralized,
and usually are made at a variable rate that is
above market rates and at least 50 basis points
above the basic discount rate.
Seasonal credit is designed to supply the pre-
dictable needs of healthy institutions that are
thought to be too small and isolated to have
access to sources of short-term credit compara-
ble to that of larger institutions. Maturities are tai-
lored to the pattern of an institution's seasonal
funding gap. To qualify, an institution normally
must have total deposits of less than $500 mil-
lion and must demonstrate a recurring pattern of
seasonal swings in the net availability of lend-
able funds, measured as total deposits minus
total loans. An institution qualifying for a sea-
sonal line must fund a portion of its seasonal
funding need, calculated as 2 percent of the first
$100 million of its deposits, 6 percent of the next
$100 million, and 10 percent of its deposits in
excess of $200 million. Loans must be collateral-
ized, and are made at the same basic discount
rate as is charged for adjustment credit.
Seasonal borrowing in the aggregate has dis-
played two regularities: a pronounced seasonal
pattern, and a response to the economic incentive
to borrow (see figure 1). The seasonal pattern
shows borrowing growing to a peak in the
summer and then falling away to a minimum in
the winter, with the peak being about five times
larger than the succeeding minimum in recent
years. The seasonal pattern is thought to reflect
an agricultural credit cycle, because most bor-
rowing banks are in agricultural regions of the
country.
At the same time, and sometimes overriding
the seasonal pattern, the total amount borrowed
seems to respond to the size of the spread
between market interest rates and the discount
rate charged for seasonal borrowing. For exam-
ple, market rates were lower than the discount
rate during 1975-76, and borrowing declined to
minimal levels. The 1975 and 1976 seasonal
peak monthly amounts of borrowing averaged
only 30 percent of peak levels during the
preceding two years. Again, in the four months
after April 1980, the federal funds rate moved
from about 400 basis points higher than the dis-
count rate to almost 200 basis points lower. At
the same time, seasonal borrowing declined in a
counterseasonal movement that brought it to the
second-lowest monthly level on record.
Reviewing past movements in seasonal bor-
rowing also suggests the relatively small scale
and limited role the program plays within the
banking and monetary system (see table 1).
Fewer than 5 percent of commercial banks were
borrowers in 1988, when aggregate borrowing
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a. See footnote 3.
SOURCES: Melichar (1980), Timenes and Melichar (1973), and Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System.
was at its then-record high. This was most likely
a smaller percentage of the number of banks
potentially qualified to borrow than the 21 per-
cent of potentially qualified banks that borrowed
in 1979
3 Reflecting the small size of eligible
banks, as well as the low incidence of borrowers
among those banks eligible to borrow, seasonal
borrowing never has accounted for as much as 1




The market economy of the United States relies
heavily on the decisions of private owners of
resources, in response to market signals, to
determine how and what goods and services get
produced. All else being equal, if owners of
small banks were unable to earn a competitive
rate of return while meeting seasonal credit
demands in their chosen market areas, they
would be expected to turn their resources to
some alternative use. Their potential customers
would seek out other lenders to meet their
credit needs or, if unable to find satisfactory
accommodation elsewhere, they would likewise
be expected to turn their resources to some
alternative use. Subjecting the ongoing process
of resource management to this competitive
market discipline is the fundamental test for wise
resource allocation.
Government intervention in the operation of a
market rests on the political judgment that there
would be something unwise about the pure
market outcome. More than that, it can be
argued, evidence that the pure market outcome
is deficient must be sufficiently compelling to
accept the risk that tinkering will create new and
unforeseen distortions that are worse than the
original deficiency.
Financial market regulation is a familiar
example. The structure of financial markets in
the United States was influenced in basic ways
by regulations originating in legislation of the
1930s. More recently, legislation has been
reshaping that financial structure, with an
emphasis on deregulation. An important objec-
tive has been to reduce distortions emanating
from regulation in order to allow fuller reliance
on private decisions and market discipline in
determining the structure of financial markets,
including the number and size of depository
institutions and their geographical extent, prod-
uct lines, and pricing.
The seasonal borrowing program originated
during the 1960s as a result of concerns about
whether private financial markets were equipped
to finance the long-term capital needs of the agri-
cultural sector and, in that context, whether small
banks would have sufficient liquidity to meet sea-
sonal needs of agricultural borrowers.
4 Banks
had accumulated large portfolios of liquid assets
during the previous 30 years, including large
holdings of U.S. government securities acquired
during World War II. This meant that banks had
been able to fund even very large seasonal swings
in loans relative to deposits by selling liquid
assets, for which there was an active national
market accessible by the smallest of banks.
• 3 "Most likely" because the Monetary Control Act nearly doubled the
number of banks eligible to seek qualification by extending the program to
nonmember banks. Had the percentage of qualified banks actually borrowing
remained unchanged at 21 percent in 1988 and the number of qualified
member banks remained about the same, the implication would be that only
about 8.5 percent of 7,600 nonmember banks qualified for the program. This
seems so implausible—because nonmember banks tend to be smaller and
less urban than member banks—that the alternative conclusion seems most
likely. Only commercial banks are considered, even though other depository
institutions also gained access to the discount window through the Monetary
Control Act of 1980. Typically, the program is not used by these nonbanks
because credit is available from special industry lenders, such as the Federal
Home Loan Banks.
• 4 Melichar and Doll (1971).
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worked off by most banks. Those facing dispro-
portionately large seasonal funding needs either
would have had to retain disproportionately
large portfolios of low-yield liquid assets, on
average, or they would have had to rely on alter-
native markets in which to sell loans or purchase
funds if they were to meet seasonal needs.
Research findings in the 1960s suggested that
"...a significant proportion of banks [had] large
relative seasonal outflows of funds; that these
banks tend[ed] to be small, presumably with
limited access to financial markets that larger
banks could use to meet such pressures."
5
The presumption that the relevant small banks
had more limited access to financial markets than
did other banks was familiar during the late 1960s
and the early 1970s, when the seasonal borrow-
ing program was devised and put into place.
Small banks with disproportionately large sea-
sonal needs for funds were mostly rural banks in
agricultural areas where the "spatial allocation of
bank credit" through markets was thought to be
an imperfect means of attracting surplus funds
from other areas. The interbank market was
limited, except perhaps for overnight federal
funds and through the correspondent banking
system. Only recently had Regulation Q govern-
ing deposit-rate ceilings been relaxed, providing
large banks, at least, with new power to use
deposit rates on large certificates of deposit
(CDs) to attract funds. Correspondent banks
were seen as sometimes unreliable sources of
support, especially where their interests were in
competition with those of their respondents.
6
The seasonal borrowing program was designed
for small banks with large seasonal outflows of
funds and "limited access to financial markets."
7
When Federal Reserve Banks lend to these small
banks, the resulting increased stock of bank
reserves must be absorbed by equivalent Federal
Reserve open market sales in the government
securities market in order to maintain monetary
• 5 Melichar (1971), p. 95.
• 6 Modigliani (1971).
• 7 This was not a unanimous interpretation of the rationale at the outset.
It was not until 1980 that the Monetary Control Act removed membership in
the Federal Reserve System as an issue thought to be relevant to many Sys-
tem decisions. Prior to that, the seasonal borrowing program was available
only to member banks, and some perceived the basic motivation for the pro-
gram as an effort to "...offset the growing net tax [primarily of reserve
requirements] on member banks, thereby reducing their incentive to quit the
System" (Kane [1974], p. 846).
policy unchanged. In effect, the program provides
borrowing banks with a nonmarket, assured con-
duit to the money market. Eligibility depends on
the size of a bank and on the seasonality of its
loans relative to deposits, not on an explicit




Recent large aggregate amounts of seasonal bor-
rowing might be interpreted as prima facie evi-
dence that the original rationale for the program
remains compelling. However, this need not be
so. The number of borrowers remains low rela-
tive to the number that are likely to be qualified
to borrow, there is a clear rate incentive to bor-
row, and changes in financial market structure
since 1973 should be expected to have reduced
the need to rely on the program.
The number of banks taking advantage of the
seasonal borrowing program seems to have been
lower than expected from the outset of the pro-
gram. Initial estimates were that approximately
2,000 banks had substantial seasonal calls for
funds and that the vast majority of these had less
than $50 million in assets, implying that a large
number of banks might take advantage of the
new program.
8 However, only 205 banks actually
borrowed during the first (abbreviated) year of
the program, and only 155 of those were among
the 2,000 banks that had been identified as
potential users.
9
Although the number of borrowers had more
than doubled by 1979, borrowers still represented
only 21 percent of the banks potentially eligible
to use the program. In 1980, the number of
banks potentially eligible to borrow was substan-
tially augmented by the Monetary Control Act,
which opened the program to nonmember com-
mercial banks. As a result, the number of poten-
tially eligible institutions had probably about
doubled by 1988, although no systematic esti-
mate is available.
1
0 Despite the expanded pool
of potential borrowers, the number of actual
borrowers was only 40 percent greater than in
1979- In short, despite indications that size and
seasonality would qualify a few thousand banks
8 Federal Reserve press release, April 5,1973.
9 Timenes and Melichar (1973).
10 See footnote 3.
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evidence from actual use of the seasonal borrow-
ing program suggests that the competitive disad-
vantage of limited access never has been as
extensive as might have been supposed.
The perception that limited access has not
been widespread was reinforced by nationwide
experience with the Temporary Simplified Sea-
sonal Credit Program, which began in 1985. The
simplified program was made available to banks
with deposits of less than $200 million that had
an above-average concentration of farm loans
and a loan-to-deposit ratio of at least 55 percent
(initially 60 percent). Eligibility required no
detailed calculations showing a historical sea-
sonal pattern of need for funds.
A reported expectation was that total seasonal
borrowing might triple during the first year of
the simplified program, but the actual level of
seasonal borrowing remained below that of the
previous year.
1
1 In the three-year life of the sim-
plified program, borrowing never exceeded a
monthly average of $14 million, even during the
years of severe agricultural distress for which the
program was designed. Apparently, markets were
not failing to supply funds to agricultural banks,
although it may be that banks were not receiving
bankable loan requests from potential borrowers.
The fact remains, however, that some banks
do use the seasonal borrowing program. The
question, then, concerns the extent to which
their use provides evidence of limited access, for
typically there is a clear economic incentive to
use the program.
1
2 The program represents a
"good deal" when the discount rate is lower
than market rates. If banks borrow in response to
the favorable rate spread, the implication is that
they find market sources of funds, or do not
lend, when the rate spread is less favorable;
expected profit, not limited access, generates use
of the program.
The two periods of pronounced minimal use
(1975-76 and 1980) also were the only sustained
periods since 1973 during which the discount
rate actually was higher than the federal funds
rate. But there is a counterargument: These also
• 11 Wall Street Journal, March 11, 1985.
• 12 A related question is not addressed here. As indicated in table 1, the
number of banks and percent of all commercial banks borrowing have
increased over the life of the program. Some banks truly may have the "need"
for seasonal borrowing as envisioned in the program, but it is not clear how
heavily the needs of a few borrowers should be allowed to weigh in providing
a special program.
were periods of loose monetary policy, in which
correspondent banks might have been expected
to service smaller banks with seasonal needs
because correspondents did not have better
alternatives in the money and loan markets. That
is, limited access would not occur unless mone-
tary policy were restrictive.
1
3
The restrictiveness of monetary policy, how-
ever, is not an either/or matter, and the rate
spread is not necessarily an indicator of policy
restraint. Restrictive policy refers jointly to a
restrained supply of base money (relative to
demand) and to the high federal funds rate
required to equilibrate the market for base
money. The supply of base money could be
quite restrictive, even with no borrowing, if the
discount rate were high relative to the high fed-
eral funds rate, choking off the demand for bor-
rowing. Under these circumstances, the supply
of base money would include a large proportion
of nonborrowed reserves and few borrowed
reserves. Alternatively, the same degree of
restraint could be achieved with fewer nonbor-
rowed reserves and correspondingly more bor-
rowing if the discount rate were far below a very
high federal funds rate, accommodating a large
demand for borrowing.
The rate spread simply measures the cost
advantage of discount borrowing, including the
cost advantage of using the seasonal borrowing
program, and there is evidence of a consistent
positive relationship between the aggregate
amount of seasonal borrowing and the rate
spread. Econometric estimates of the demand for
seasonal borrowing for the period 1984-88 find
that the rate spread was a statistically significant
explanatory variable (see box 1). Thus, at least
some of the actual seasonal borrowing may not
reflect borrowers' limited access to financial
markets, but simply the fact that size and season-
ality make the borrowers eligible for the attrac-
tive interest rate available through the program.
Declining Relevance
of Limited Access
The evolution of financial market structure since
1973 makes limited access seem a more tenuous
rationale for the program now than originally. No
single dramatic development can be cited as
removing limits on small banks' access to finan-
cial markets for seasonal funding. Rather, an
13 Melichar (1971,1980) makes this argument.
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The equation below shows the estimated relationship
between seasonal borrowing and the spread between the
federal funds rate and discount rate, plus three variables cap-
turing temporary or permanent shifts in the relationship prior
to 1988. The demand for seasonal borrowing was not signifi-
cantly affected during the Continental Illinois period (June-

































Durbin-Watson statistic (adjusted for 0 gaps) = 0.2334
Sum of squared residuals = 630807
Standard error of the regression = 74.0626
F-statistic (4, 115) = 23.316
Significance level = 0.0 percent
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Svstem.
accumulation of a variety of market developments
has moderated the concern about limited access
to financial markets that provided the original
rationale for the seasonal borrowing program.
Developments in the federal funds market
itself should have reduced seasonal inflexibility.
By 1981, a year of peak participation in the funds
market, almost 85 percent of small U.S. banks
(with assets less than $300 million) were partici-
pants in the federal funds market on the selling
side, and 40 percent on the buying side. Although
most of the volume being sold undoubtedly
represents the upstream flow of balances from
smaller banks to their larger correspondent
banks, nonetheless, more than half of the small
purchasing banks were independent banks, the
category most likely to fit the limited-access
rationale behind the program.
1
4
Regulation Q, which set ceilings on deposit
interest rates, has been phased out completely.
The prohibition of explicit interest payments on
narrowly defined demand deposits is the only
remaining regulation that might constrain deposi-
tory institutions from setting rates competitive
enough to attract deposits away from the national
markets. Reliance on brokered deposits may be
inappropriate for small institutions from a super-
visory point of view, but widespread reliance on
term consumer CDs has strengthened the ability
of even the smallest of insured institutions to
attract and manage liabilities in competition with
other depository institutions and securities.
Within the banking industry, changes in
market structure have reduced the market isola-
tion that might have produced seasonal inflexi-
bility in the balance sheets of lending banks. The
proportion of independent banks fell by more
than half between 1973 and 1987, from 78 per-
cent to 32 percent of all banks. Absorption into
one-bank holding companies accounted for 27
percentage points of this decline, while the other
19 percentage points resulted from affiliation
with multibank holding companies.
1
5 Compared
to a correspondent relationship, affiliation with a
multibank holding company would increase the
seasonal flexibility of acquired banks through
improved access to federal funds, jumbo CDs,
and holding-company debt markets, as well as
through more assured profit-maximizing geo-
graphic distribution of funds.
Relevant changes in market structure are not
limited to those that directly affect small banks
with large seasonal pressures. When nonbank
lenders enter the credit markets, there may be
less basis for concern about the adequacy of
bank lending because potential borrowers can
be served by other lenders. Federal lending,
including that of the Federal Intermediate Credit
Banks, represented a modestly larger share of
the debt of the farm business sector in 1988 than
in 1973. However, the new federal "Farmer Mac"
program might provide an even better means of
offsetting any market deficiency that impedes
seasonal lending at small agricultural banks. The
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 established the
Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, or
Farmer Mac. This new federally chartered
instrumentality is designed to provide liquidity to
agricultural lenders by issuing guaranteed secur-
ities collateralized by farm mortgage loans, and by
• 14 Year-end Reports of Income and Condition, Federal Financial Institu-
tions Examination Council.




Best available copyfacilitating the establishment of a secondary
market in agricultural mortgages. The secondary
market allows banks to sell loans rather than
finance them with seasonal borrowing, eliminat-
ing the need for the collateral required in dis-
count window lending.
In sum, the evolution of financial market struc-
ture since 1973 has been toward deregulation,
by removing constraints that once might have
limited the response of lenders to seasonal farm
credit demands. This serves to reinforce the
implications drawn from apparently limited use
of the seasonal borrowing program, and suggests
that the rationale for the program may not be as
compelling now as it might have seemed in 1973.
III. The Monetary Policy
Connection
Before the seasonal borrowing program was
introduced in 1973, background studies had
considered whether unforeseen changes in sea-
sonal borrowing might make the appropriate
amount of open market operations more difficult
to determine. On balance, the problem was not
expected to be serious.
Since the banks will be expected to negotiate their
seasonal borrowing needs with their Reserve Banks
over their full seasonal period insofar as is feasible,
the general timing and amount of reserve injec-
tions from this source should be fairly well defined
in advance....
So long as the business of the Nation's largest
banks is such that these banks are unlikely to meet
the terms of the regulation and therefore are pre-
vented from suddenly becoming seasonal borrow-
ers, the total dimensions and variability of sea-
sonal credit assistance at the discount window
should be well within a scope that can be handled




This original expectation about "total dimen-
sions and variability of seasonal credit" cannot
be faulted. Typically, the program has provided
less than half of 1 percent of total bank reserves.
Even in peak months, it has never produced
more than 0.85 percent of total reserves, or
about two-tenths of 1 percent of base money.
The problem, however, arises from the combina-
tion of even more modest "total dimensions...of
seasonal credit" than might have been antici-
pated and a different method of open market
operations than was foreseen when the program
was adopted.
In its broadest sense, monetary policy oper-
ates by controlling the stock of base money—
currency plus bank reserves—available to the
economy. Base money is the liability of Federal
Reserve Banks, consisting of Federal Reserve
notes plus Federal Reserve deposits owned by
depository institutions.
The stock of base money increases or decreases
when the Federal Reserve buys or sells Treasury
securities through domestic open market opera-
tions, as well as when Federal Reserve Banks
lend to or are repaid by depository institutions at
the discount window. This is because the
amounts purchased and loaned are added directly
to the deposit accounts of depository institutions,
just as sales and loan repayments are subtracted
directly from those accounts. Clearly, controlling
the stock of base money requires a procedure
for policy implementation that coordinates the
open market and discount window functions.
1
7
What was not foreseen in 1973 was that in
1982, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) would adopt a borrowed reserve
procedure for implementing monetary policy.
This involves specifying an objective for the level
of adjustment plus seasonal borrowing to be
achieved by the manager of the System Open
Market Account through open market operations
occurring between FOMC meetings. The man-
ager can achieve a borrowed reserve objective
because, by the end of a reserve maintenance
period, initial estimates are available of the
actual amount of reserve deposits that institu-
tions need to satisfy their reserve requirements.
In addition, demand for excess reserves can be
estimated with reasonable accuracy. Supplying
less than this combined need for reserves
through open market operations makes it neces-
sary for some combination of institutions to bor-
row the remainder at the discount window.
1
8
The borrowed reserve procedure is a way of
controlling the federal funds rate; the policy-
16 Holland and Garvy (1972), pp. 193-94.
• 17 At the direction of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve sometimes
intervenes in foreign exchange markets, buying or selling dollars. Controlling
the stock of base money also requires coordination of domestic open market
operations with these foreign exchange market operations.
• 18 Extended credit is not included in the borrowing target, but is treated
as a component of nonborrowed reserves. This means that increases in
extended credit are a substitute for open market purchases of securities in
carrying out open market operations.
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sistent with the policy-intended level of the fed-
eral funds rate. A higher borrowing objective,
generally described in the FOMC's policy direc-
tive as a higher "degree of reserve restraint,"
normally would be associated with a higher
expected spread of the federal funds rate above
the discount rate. This is because institutions are
reluctant to use their adjustment borrowing privi-
lege, lest it preclude borrowing in a future period
of greater (or more profitable) need. In the
attempt to avoid borrowing, institutions bid for
federal funds in the interbank market where they
buy and sell reserves, until the rate rises enough
to induce them to borrow the necessary amount
of reserves at the discount window. Similarly, at
higher market rates relative to the discount rate,
the seasonal borrowing option becomes more
attractive, adding to borrowed reserves.
Controlling the federal funds rate by controlling
borrowing depends on the existence of a predict-
able relationship between the amount of adjust-
ment plus seasonal borrowing and the average
spread of the funds rate above the discount rate.
Transitory variations in reserve demand and
supply may be associated with transitory varia-
tions in the federal funds rate; on average, how-
ever, the rate will be at the intended level. An
alternative way to control the rate would be by
frequent, perhaps small, open market purchases
and sales that would counteract transitory rate
pressures arising from fluctuations in demand
and supply, and that would signal to the market
when the funds rate is above or below the
policy-intended level.
With either procedure, transitory variations in
the funds rate would be damped to the extent
market participants had rather firm expectations
about the equilibrium level of the rate. Relative
to the alternative, the borrowed reserve proce-
dure relies more heavily on private market
adjustments in the funds rate to accommodate
transitory deviations of reserve demand and Sys-
tem supply from levels that, on average, are con-
sistent with monetary policy. The alternative
funds rate procedure would be more likely to
accommodate those transitory deviations
through open market operations.
1
9
The potential advantage of a borrowed reserve
procedure is in allowing changes in market per-
ceptions of basic money and credit demand to
feed into the reserves market and to cumulate in
funds rate movements without delay. A funds
rate procedure, on the other hand, would pre-
vent rate movements resulting from changes in
basic money and credit demand and would
delay balance sheet adjustments by depository
institutions. Only the frequency and direction of




A disadvantage of the borrowed reserve
procedure is that policy could become poorly
defined or communicated if the borrowing/
funds rate relationship shifts. An unexpected
shift will lead to some mix of persistent devia-
tions of the funds rate and borrowing from the
values intended by the FOMC, until this shift is
identified and the borrowing objective adjusted.
In the very short run, this mix depends on the
degree of confidence the manager places in
daily reserve projections relative to signals from
the funds market as competing guides to the
sign and size of needed open market operations
during a reserve maintenance period. During an
intermeeting period, a shift in the borrowing/
funds rate relationship might place the manager
in the awkward position of having to choose
between the FOMC's specified borrowing objec-
tive and intended funds rate as the relevant meas-
ure of reserve restraint to be achieved through
open market operations. Clarification from the
FOMC might be needed to avoid a misunder-
standing about the manager's stewardship in car-
rying out the policy directive.
Uncertainty about the reliability of the
borrowing/funds rate relationship also could add
an extra layer of complexity to FOMC delibera-
tions. Members who already must reconcile their
individual policy predilections into a single policy
directive also would have to reconcile their indi-
vidual views about the relative merits of risking
unexpected changes either in the funds rate or in
borrowing when instructing the manager. More-
over, in the markets, policy signals also would
become less clear under these circumstances,
reflecting market uncertainty about whether the
• 19 Thornton (1988) provides a useful examination of these alternative
operating procedure matters.
• 20 A second possible advantage might be that a borrowed reserve
objective leaves the federal funds rate implication of monetary policy decisions
slightly ambiguous in the very short run. This has the disadvantage that
market observers cannot distinguish immediately between funds rate changes
intended by policy and changes induced by market pressures. However, this
ambiguity might facilitate reaching a consensus when monetary policy deci-
sions are made infrequently (FOMC meetings typically are scheduled six to
eight weeks apart) and are contingent on forecasts of near-term economic
developments. Members may agree on a course of action more readily if the
implication of their action includes slightly different funds rate preferences or
somewhat different anticipations for the economy by various members.
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a. Diminished focus on borrowing objective in supplying nonborrowed
reserves.
b. Change in borrowing objective to reflect change in willingness to borrow.
c. Explicitly attributed to seasonal borrowing.
SOURCE: Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee.
observed level of borrowing or of the funds rate
represented the intention of policy.
2
1
Responding to Shifts in
Borrowing Demand
Open market operations today are conducted
within a policy milieu that perceives a lasting
change in the federal funds rate of about 25
basis points as evidence of a meaningful change
in reserve restraint. In recent years, a $100 mil-
lion (or perhaps smaller) change in the target
for adjustment plus seasonal borrowing normally
would have been expected to produce such a
• 21 There was a time when the FOMC was willing to accept a federal
funds rate outcome between meetings within a range of several hundred basis
points without reconvening for further deliberation. However, this was in the
period of strict monetary targeting between late 1979 and late 1982, when
open market operations were guided by yet a third method, with a nonbor-
rowed reserve policy objective. Under that procedure, however, the 400-basis-
point range was not the deviation from the expected funds rate acceptable in
setting reserve restraint. Rather, 400 basis points was the range within which
the FOMC was willing to allow the reserve restraint setting itself to vary in
response to monetary growth.
change in the rate spread. On that basis, a shift
in the demand for borrowed reserves on the
order of $100 million, unless offset by a compa-
rable change in the borrowing objective, might
be mistaken in markets for a change in policy.
Unexpected shifts in the borrowing/funds rate
relationship have occurred in the past, although
they were not necessarily related to the seasonal
borrowing program. A temporary reduction in
willingness to borrow was observed during the
summer of 1984, in apparent reaction to prob-
lems at the Continental Illinois Bank. In early
1986 and again in late 1987, apparently perma-
nent changes in the demand for discount-
window credit were observed. In each case, the
estimated magnitude of the shift was substantial
in the sense that, had the shift not been offset by
adjusting the target for borrowing, the potential
change in the funds rate would likely have been
interpreted as a change in policy.
Between the October 1988 and February 1990
meetings, the record of FOMC policy actions
frequently noted apparent or potential shifts in
the borrowing/funds rate relationship. These
shifts were, in part, associated with the seasonal
borrowing program (table 2). As shown in figure
2, the decline in adjustment plus seasonal bor-
rowing from late summer 1988 to early spring
1989, despite an increase of 100 basis points in
the rate spread, suggests the magnitude of the
shift in the borrowing function that the Commit-
tee offset. While adjustment borrowing rose,
consistent with a larger rate spread, seasonal bor-
rowing declined by more than enough to offset
that increase.
The same may be said of the increase in adjust-
ment plus seasonal borrowing after spring 1989,
despite a 70-basis-point decrease in the rate
spread. While adjustment borrowing fell, con-
sistent with a reduced rate spread, seasonal bor-
rowing increased by more than enough to offset
that decline. It was not the seasonality of pro-
gram borrowing that was a problem, but the
unexpected amplitude of the seasonality in con-
junction with low levels of adjustment borrow-
ing that, if not offset, might have produced a
noticeable deviation of the funds rate from its
intended setting.
The onset of this extended episode was noted
in a November 1988 Committee conference call
when "...it became increasingly evident in the
implementation of policy that depository institu-
tions had reduced their demands on the discount
window..." and the System Open Market Account
manager "...adjusted the reserve paths to incor-
porate a lower level of borrowing...." The Com-
mittee "...agreed that the factors relating to the
apparent change in the relationship between
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borrowing and the federal funds rate, and the
broader implications for the conduct of open
market operations, would be reviewed further at
the December meeting." The December record
indicated that "...the procedure of focusing on
the degree of reserve restraint, as indexed by
borrowed reserves, had been implemented with
some flexibility in recent weeks in light of the
substantial shortfall of borrowing in relation to
expectations."
After discussion at the December meeting,
"...[the] Committee concluded that no changes
in the current procedure were needed at [that]
time, but that flexibility would remain important
in accomplishing Committee objectives under
changing circumstances." At each of its next
three meetings, in February, March, and May of
1989, it was "understood" or "accepted" that
open market operations would be conducted
with "flexibility" in the light of "uncertainties" in
the borrowing/funds rate relationship.
By May, the reduced demands on the discount
window appeared to be passing, "...largely
because of a surge in seasonal borrowing—and,
according to a staff analysis, unchanged reserve
conditions over the upcoming intermeeting
period might encompass somewhat higher aver-
age borrowing." For the remainder of 1989,
"flexibility" in response to "uncertainty" was
succeeded by "technical upward revisions" (July
and August meeting records) and then "technical
reductions" (November and December meeting
records) in the level of adjustment plus seasonal
borrowing used in setting reserve objectives for
open market operations. These adjustments to the
index of reserve restraint reflected "unusual
strength/strength" and then "a decline/a continu-
ing decline" in seasonal borrowing.
Flexibility in policy implementation can be
achieved because daily decisions about open
market operations can reflect a mixed strategy.
Daily estimates of the demand for total reserves
relative to the estimated actual supply of nonbor-
rowed reserves suggest the amount of open mar-
ket operations needed to achieve a borrowed
reserve objective for a reserve maintenance
period. However, inconsistent behavior of the
federal funds rate may suggest the possibility of
errors in estimates of reserve demand or supply,
or in the estimated borrowing/funds rate rela-
tionship, and can lead to open market opera-
tions being shaded accordingly. Conceptually, a
pure borrowed-reserve objective would have no
such contingency for using funds-rate informa-
tion. The degree of flexibility in implementation
might be judged by the extent to which the
funds rate diverges from its expected level with-
out triggering open market operations that are
not strictly consistent with reserve estimates.
The complicating factors for monetary policy
associated with the seasonal borrowing program
are the need for flexibility in policy implementa-
tion and for technical changes in the borrowing
objective. Complicating policy implementation is
not the same as thwarting policy implementation.
The Committee can and apparently did achieve
intended levels of the federal funds rate despite
uncertainty about, and shifts in, the borrowing/
funds rate relationship, which emanated in part
from the seasonal borrowing program. Compli-
cating policy implementation simply avoids a
disadvantage of the borrowed reserve procedure
— unintended changes in the federal funds rate
occurring as a result of changes in the
borrowing/funds rate relationship. At the same
time, however, complicating monetary policy
may mean losing the advantage of the borrowed
reserve procedure—rapid response of the funds
rate to changing market perceptions of underly-
ing demands for money and credit.
Nothing need be lost if the borrowing objec-
tive requires only frequent technical changes to
incorporate a predictable seasonal pattern of sea-
sonal borrowing. In fact, if the seasonal process
could be predicted with sufficient accuracy, the
borrowed reserve index of reserve restraint
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levels. This would avoid any potential confusion
between technical and policy changes in the
index of reserve restraint. Other than that step,
the borrowed reserve procedure could operate
unchanged, allowing changing market percep-
tions of basic money and credit demand to feed
into the funds rate in the very short run.
Of course, it may not be possible to predict the
seasonal process with such reliability. The less
predictable the seasonal changes in seasonal
borrowing, the more difficult it must become to
estimate the short-term technical changes
required to avoid inadvertent policy changes in
the borrowed reserve index of reserve restraint.
In the past, when the level and amplitude of sea-
sonal movements in seasonal borrowing were
small relative to adjustment borrowing, this
problem appears to have been eclipsed or offset
by movements in adjustment borrowing. Now,
flexibility becomes more important in achieving
the intended funds rate when uncertainty
obscures the expected level of seasonal borrow-
ing. What is lost is simply the possibility of a
response of the funds rate in the very short run
to changing market perceptions of underlying
demands for money and credit.
Upon closer inspection, this seeming loss
actually may be a gain. Seasonal borrowing has
become a substantially larger, frequently domi-
nant, share of total adjustment plus seasonal bor-
rowing used as the guide for open market opera-
tions. Without flexibility, the danger is that the
funds rate would be responding in the very short
run largely to unexpected changes in underlying
demands for credit in the agricultural sector of
the economy. The rationale for the seasonal bor-
rowing program is that eligible borrowers are
thought to have limited access to the financial
markets that other institutions use. To the extent
that agricultural credit conditions were not
representative of those in the economy at large,
the Committee would not want to allow changes
in seasonal borrowing originating in the agricul-
tural sector to show through in short-run move-
ments in the federal funds rate.
cally available to borrowers. Evolution of finan-
cial market structure since the program began in
1973 should have had the effect of reducing
market isolation of eligible banks, weakening
limited access as the rationale for the program.
Light usage and reduced isolation suggest that
the need for the program may be confined to a
relatively small number of banks for which the
original program rationale may still apply.
Rapid growth of peak-period seasonal borrow-
ing in recent years is said to have complicated
monetary policy implementation, contrary to
expectations that existed when the program was
introduced. These complications have arisen
because the FOMC has been using a borrowed
reserve procedure to guide open market opera-
tions since 1982. Technical changes in the
Committee's borrowing objective can prevent
unintended movements of the funds rate when
there are predictable swings in seasonal borrow-
ing over the course of a year. Similarly, flexibility
in pursuing a borrowing objective can prevent
unintended rate movements to the extent that
seasonal borrowing cannot be predicted reliably.
Flexibility allows the FOMC to achieve an
intended level of the federal funds rate when the
appropriate borrowed reserve objective is hard
to predict. In so doing, flexibility removes the
borrowed reserve procedure's advantage of
allowing the funds rate to be immediately
responsive to changes in market perceptions of
the underlying demand for money and credit.
This seems entirely appropriate when borrowing
is dominated by the seasonal borrowing of
small, largely agricultural banks with limited
access to financial markets.
IV. Conclusion
The Federal Reserve's seasonal borrowing pro-
gram was designed for small banks with marked
seasonal needs for funds and was intended to
remedy their presumed limited access to finan-
cial markets upon which larger banks relied for
liquidity. Use of the program has been light rela-
tive to the number of banks likely to be eligible,
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